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INTRODUCTION
Due to the popularity of camcorder and multi-
media cell phone, digital video is more and more 
widely used in our everyday life and work. The 
rising of video sharing sites on Internet makes 
the spread of digital video easy and fast. The 
forgery of digital video is also facilitated by a 
variety of video editing software, which may 
cause serious forensic problems if the tampered 
videos are used in legal evidence, news reports 
or security monitoring tapes. Since the detec-
tion of video forgery is challenged by the huge 
amount of digital video data, the research of 
accurate and rapid forgery detection algorithms 
is of paramount significance.
There are various ways of tampering with 
digital videos, inspiring a wide range of detec-
tion approaches, such as the algorithm based 
on compression and quantization (Wang et al., 
2006, 2009; Su et al., 2011), effect of interlac-
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ABSTRACT
Frame	duplication	is	a	common	way	of	digital	video	forgeries.	State-of-the-art	approaches	of	duplication	
detection	usually	suffer	from	heavy	computational	load.	In	this	paper,	the	authors	propose	a	new	algorithm	to	
detect	duplicated	frames	based	on	video	sub-sequence	fingerprints.	The	fingerprints	employed	are	extracted	
from	the	DCT	coefficients	of	the	temporally	informative	representative	images	(TIRIs)	of	the	sub-sequences.	
Compared	with	other	similar	algorithms,	 this	study	focuses	on	improving	fingerprints	representing	video	
sub-sequences	and	introducing	a	simple	metric	for	the	matching	of	video	sub-sequences.	Experimental	results	
show	that	the	proposed	algorithm	overall	outperforms	three	related	duplication	forgery	detection	algorithms	
in	terms	of	computational	efficiency,	detection	accuracy	and	robustness	against	common	video	operations	
like	compression	and	brightness	change.
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ing (Wang et al., 2007a), characteristic of noise 
(Hsu et al., 2008; Kobayashi et al., 2010), 
fusion of features (Chetty et al., 2010) and so 
on. Some algorithms detect the forgery based 
on the artifacts brought by tampering, such as 
the motion-compensated edge artifacts (Su et 
al., 2009), the ghost shadow artifacts (Zhang et 
al., 2009) and so on. Among various tampering 
approaches, frame duplication is a simple but 
the most widely used one, so the detection of 
frame duplication has attracted lots of attention 
from researchers. Wang et al. (2007b) pro-
posed a frame duplication detection algorithm 
based on correlation coefficient matrix. While 
achieving satisfactory detection accuracy, the 
algorithm requires heavy computational load 
due to the large amount of correlation calcula-
tion. To reduce the computational cost, Lin et 
al. (2011) proposed to use histogram difference 
(HD) instead of correlation coefficients as the 
detection features. However, the HD features 
do not show strong robustness against com-
mon video operations or attacks. In practical 
applications, both computational efficiency 
and robustness must be taken into account. To 
satisfy these requirements, we aim at designing a 
fast and robust duplication detection algorithm. 
This work focuses on improving fingerprints 
representing video sub-sequences and introduc-
ing a simple metric to judge whether two video 
sub-sequences are matched.
The remainder of this paper is organized 
as follows: First, we will review two related 
frame duplication detection algorithms. Our 
proposed detection algorithm will be elaborated 
afterwards. Then we present the results of 
comparative experiment and discussion. Finally 
we will conclude the paper in the last section.
RELATED WORKS
Wang et al. (2007b) proposed a frame dupli-
cation detection algorithm. The video is first 
divided into overlapping sub-sequences, with 
only one different frame between adjacent 
sub-sequences. For each sub-sequence, they 
computed the correlation coefficient between 
each pair of frames, composing a correlation 
coefficient matrix that carries the temporal 
information of this sub-sequence. To judge 
whether two sub-sequences are duplicated, the 
correlation coefficient between the matrixes 
of these two sub-sequences are calculated and 
compared with a threshold. If the coefficient 
exceeds the threshold, the two sub-sequences 
may be duplicated. To confirm the duplication, 
spatial information is used for further detection. 
Specifically, they divided the two frames into 
non-overlapping blocks and calculated the cor-
relation coefficient between each pair of blocks 
in corresponding positions. They recorded the 
number of block pairs having large correlation 
coefficients. If the number exceeds a predefined 
threshold, they considered the two frames were 
duplicates of each other, which indicated that the 
video had undergone duplication forgery. How-
ever, the calculation of correlation coefficient 
is known to be time consuming; and moreover, 
the correlation coefficient was employed twice 
to represent the temporal and spatial informa-
tion, respectively. As a result, their algorithm 
requires a heavy computation load.
The algorithm proposed by Lin et al. (2011) 
has similar pre-processing operation to that of 
Wang’s (2007b). The video is also divided into 
overlapping sub-sequences with only one dif-
ferent frame between adjacent sub-sequences. 
For each sub-sequence, the histogram difference 
(HD) rather than the correlation coefficient 
between each two adjacent frames is calculated:
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of R, G and B channels of a frame while h
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h
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B
t  represent the histograms of its 
adjacent frame. N
bin
denotes the number of bins 
in the color histograms.
For a sub-sequence of lengthN , a feature 
vector with N −1  elements is obtained by 
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calculating the HD between each two adjacent 
frames. This vector contains the temporal in-
formation of the sub-sequence. If the correlation 
coefficient between two HD vectors exceeds a 
threshold, the corresponding two sub-sequenc-
es are likely to be duplicated. Further investiga-
tion based on spatial information is then re-
quired. The authors divided the two suspicious 
frames into non-overlapping blocks and com-
puted the HD between each pair of correspond-
ing blocks. They recorded the number of block 
pairs having small HD values. If the number 
exceeds a predefined threshold, they judged 
that the two frames were duplicates of each 
other and the video had undergone duplication 
forgery. Compared to the correlation coefficient 
calculation in Wang et al. (2007b), the small 
complexity of HD calculating makes this ap-
proach more efficient.
THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM
Temporal features can reflect the characteristics 
of a video sequence over time while spatial 
features can reflect the characteristics of a 
frame. The algorithms of Wang et al. (2007b) 
and Lin et al. (2011) both adopt a two-step 
detection scheme in which temporal and spatial 
information of each sub-sequence is dealt with 
separately. However, we think that the detec-
tion time can be shortened when the temporal 
information and the spatial information are 
integrated into one feature. A possible way 
of integrating the temporal information and 
the spatial information is to consider a video 
as a three-dimensional matrix and to perform 
three-dimensional discrete cosine transform 
(3D-DCT) (Coskun et al., 2006) on it. But the 
complexity of computing 3D-DCT is known to 
be very high. We find that the DCT of temporally 
informative representative images (TIRI-DCT) 
proposed in Esmaeili et al. (2011) is an appropri-
ate feature for each sub-sequence. TIRI-DCT 
was originally used for a digital fingerprint for 
video copy detection. In this paper, we borrow 
the idea and improve fingerprints representing 
video sub-sequences. We then apply these 
fingerprints to frame duplication detection.
The construction steps of the fingerprint 
are described as follows. Firstly, the video is 
divided into overlapping sub-sequence with 
only one different frame between adjacent sub-
sequences. Each sub-sequence is downsampled 
in time domain to reduce the number of frames 
to be computed. Downsampling often causes the 
loss of temporal information, but the detection 
accuracy would not be affected as long as the 
sampling interval is smaller than the length of 
the duplicated video sequence. The TIRI of each 
sub-sequence is calculated as the weighted sum 
of the frames:
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where l
m n k, ,
 is the luminance value of the 
m n,( ) th pixel of the kth  frame, and ωk  is the 
weight of the kth frame, J  denotes the frame 
number of the sub-sequence after downsam-
pling. Apparently the TIRI contains the tempo-
ral information of each sub-sequence.
Secondly, the TIRI is divided into overlap-
ping blocks of size 2 2w w× , each having 50% 
of the area overlapped with the vertical and 
horizontal adjacent blocks, respectively. Figure 
1 shows the partition of each block. The reason 
for overlapping the blocks is to get adequate 
spatial information for accurate detection.
Thirdly, for each block, we perform two-
dimensional DCT and extract the two AC coef-
ficients closest to the DC coefficient as the 
features. The two AC coefficients represent the 
vertical and horizontal texture features of the 
block. The coefficients can be calculated 
through the following two equations:
α
i
T
i
v B E=  (3)
β
i
T
i
E BV=  (4)
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where α
i
 and β
i
 denote the first vertical and 
horizontal AC coefficients of the ith  block B
i
, 
respectively. V is a column vector with 2w
elements and
V w w w= −( ) ( ) ( ) cos . , cos . , , cos .0 5 2 1 5 2 0 5 2pi pi pi pi ,
E  is an all ones column vector of length 2w . 
With formulas (3) and (4), we can obtain the 
two AC coefficients without fully performing 
the DCT, which greatly reduces the computa-
tional cost.
Finally, the AC coefficients obtained are 
binarized to act as the digital fingerprint of each 
sub-sequence. We binarize the vertical and 
horizontal coefficients separately so as to reduce 
the loss of directional information of each block. 
Specifically, suppose each TIRI is divided into 
N
B
 overlapping blocks, we calculate the me-
dians mα  and mβ  of the AC coefficients as 
follows:
m median
m median
N
N
B
B
α
β
α α
β β
=
=





( ,..., )
( ,..., )
1
1
 (5)
These two medians are used as the thresh-
olds, respectively. In particular, a vertical coef-
ficient α
i
 is binarized as 0 if it is less than the 
threshold mα ; otherwise, it is binarized as 1. 
Likewise, a horizontal coefficient β
i
 is bina-
rized. After the operation, we concatenate the 
two binarized coefficient vectors together to 
form a digital fingerprint that contains both the 
temporal and spatial information of each sub-
sequence. Note that, if the number of blocks 
N
B
 is even, mα /mβ  is not any vertical/hori-
zontal AC coefficient but the average of the 
two numbers in the middle of the sorted verti-
cal/horizontal AC coefficients. As a result, the 
binarization processing always yields the equal 
number of 0’s and 1’s vertically as well as 
horizontally. So the resulting fingerprint consists 
of the same number of 0’s and 1’s. However, 
if the number of blocks N
B
 is odd, mα /mβ  is 
the number in the middle of the sorted vertical/
horizontal AC coefficients. In this case, we have 
to binarize the medians themselves. If both mα  
and mβ  are binarized as 0 or 1, the number of 
0’s and that of 1’s in the fingerprint are not 
equal. To evenly reflect vertical and horizontal 
information from the AC coefficients of the 
Figure	1.	The	block	partitioning	of	the	TIRI
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DCT, this work proposes to binarize mα /mβ  
as 0 and at the same time, mβ /mα  as 1. This 
scheme produces a balanced fingerprint, that 
is, the number of 0’s and 1’s are equal. We have 
to stress that Esmaeili et al. (2011) once proposed 
another binarization way to create the digital 
fingerprint. They first calculated the median of 
all the vertical and horizontal AC coefficients, 
and then binarize those coefficients using the 
median as the threshold to obtain a binary se-
quence, i.e., the fingerprint. Because their 
median is calculated from all the AC coefficients 
without distinguishing directions, it is most 
likely to create a fingerprint which contains 
more elements from the vertical coefficients 
than from the horizontal coefficients or the 
opposite. In other words, the resulting finger-
print cannot evenly reflect the characteristics 
of vertical coefficients and horizontal coeffi-
cients. This is the basic difference between that 
method and our method in the aspect of con-
struction of the fingerprint.
After obtaining the fingerprints of the 
sub-sequences, we need to compare each pair 
of the fingerprints to determine whether they 
are duplicate sub-sequences. If duplication 
forgery exists, the fingerprints from different 
sub-sequences should be similar. Hence, how to 
measure the similarity of two sub-sequences is 
crucial for the success of the detection algorithm. 
In this work, we propose to use the Hamming 
distance as a metric for fingerprint matching. 
The Hamming distance would be small when 
two video sequences are the same or very 
similar. As a result, if the Hamming distance 
between the fingerprints of two sub-sequences 
is less than a predefined threshold, we think 
that the frame duplication forgery exists. The 
calculation of Hamming distance is simple 
and is realizable using XOR binary operation. 
Hence the detection process of our algorithm 
is computationally efficient. Figure 2 gives the 
flowchart of our algorithm.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Each video clip used in our experiments has 300 
frames, with a sequence of about 100 frames 
intentionally duplicated. The original videos are 
in YUV format without compression.
Parameters Settings
There are three CIF format video clips used 
in experiments. We intentionally select videos 
with different characteristics. In particular, 
coastguard_cif has more dynamic content, 
where both the object and the background are 
moving fast. For news_cif, only very few regions 
Figure	2.	Flowchart	of	the	proposed	algorithm
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(e.g., mouth) on its objects in front have obvious 
movements. However, part of its background 
(e.g., the content on the small screen) changes 
very fast. Specifically, the content on the small 
screen is a clip of ballet and this clip is repeat-
edly played twice. In other words, news_cif is 
a video clip with the background containing 
partially duplicated content. On the other hand, 
in the first half of foreman_cif, this video has 
relatively static background and moving ob-
ject in front. But in the last half, the object in 
front disappears and only the relatively static 
background is left. The sample frames of these 
three videos are showed in Figure 3 through 
Figure 5. We tampered with these video clips 
and the detailed duplication information is 
listed in Table 1.
Now we discuss how to set up the param-
eters employed in our algorithm, including the 
length of sub-sequence, the interval of downs-
ampling, ω
k
 for (2.2), the block size used for 
the construction of the fingerprint, and the 
decision threshold for frame duplication detec-
Figure	3.	Sample	frames	from	videos	used	in	experiments:	coastguard_cif
Table	1.	Videos	and	their	duplication	information	
Forgery Video Duplication Information
coastguard_1 Copying 150th to 279th frames of coastguard_cif to its 0th to 129th frames.
news_1 Copying 0th to 99th frames of news_cif to its 150th to 249th frames.
foreman_1 Copying 0th to 119th frames of foreman_cif to its 150th to 269th frames.
Figure	4.	Sample	frames	from	videos	used	in	experiments:	news_cif
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tion. The length of the sub-sequence is an im-
portant parameter in experiments. A short length 
would increase the calculation time while a 
long length would miss the detection of dupli-
cation sub-sequences shorter than this length. 
So the length of sub-sequence is the lower bound 
for duplication forgery detection. In Wang et 
al. (2007b), the length of the sub-sequence was 
set to 30. For detection of 100 to 200 long 
duplication frames, this setting may make a 
good tradeoff between computational complex-
ity and detection capability. In this work, we 
set the length of the sub-sequence to 31 instead 
of 30 due to the effect of downsampling. When 
generating the TIRIs, we tend to reserve the 
first and last frames of the sub-sequence after 
downsampling in order to well represent the 
sub-sequence. We set the downsampling inter-
val to 4 so that a 31-frame long sub-sequence 
can be downsampled into 7 frames for the 
calculation of TIRI. In this case, both the first 
and last frames are selected. For the sake of 
comparison, this work also sets the length of 
sub-sequence to 31 for the algorithms in Wang 
et al. (2007b) and the HD-based algorithm (Lin 
et al., 2011). The other parameters for these 
algorithms have not been altered.
For ω
k
 in formula (2-2), we choose the 
exponential weighting function ω γ
k
k= , 
where γ = 0 64.  according to Esmaeili et al. 
(2011). The block size w  is determined based 
on the results in Table 2, where the results have 
been obtained with different values of w . Note 
that, in this paper, the TPR (True Positive Rate) 
is calculated by dividing the number of cor-
Table	2.	Performance	with	different	values	of	block	size	w	
Video Value of w TPR (%) FPR (%) Time (ms)
coastguard_1
4 100 0 63008
8 100 0 16014
16 100 20 12573
news_1
4 100 0 68234
8 100 0 16391
16 100 100 12542
foreman_1
4 100 0 65832
8 100 0 16462
16 100 46.67 12682
Figure	5.	Sample	frames	from	videos	used	in	experiments:	foreman_cif
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rectly detected forgery frames by the total 
number of the forgery frames, and the FPR 
(False Positive Rate) is calculated by dividing 
the wrongly detected forgery frames by the 
total number of the no forgery frames. The use 
of TPR and FPR can comprehensively describe 
the performance of an algorithm. We can see 
in Table 2 that a smaller value of w  often 
generates a longer fingerprint and obtains 
higher detection sensitivity but requires longer 
computation time, while a larger value of w  
makes the fingerprint shorter and the robustness 
stronger but the detection sensitivity lower. 
Apparently, the setting of w = 8  is a good 
tradeoff between time consumption and detec-
tion sensitivity.
The setting of decision threshold for the 
Hamming distance affects the detection perfor-
mance. A low threshold would raise the sensi-
tivity of detection, and at the same time, produce 
more false alarms. However, a high threshold 
would yield the converse result. In practice, the 
selection of an optimal threshold is quite com-
plex since it involves the resolution of the 
video employed, the length of digital fingerprint 
and the block size. According to our experi-
ments, we set the decision threshold to 3 in this 
work, which is a tradeoff between detection 
accuracy and robustness.
Test on Video Clips without 
Undergoing Video Operations
We first evaluate the performance of the 
proposed algorithm on videos that have not 
undergone video operations. Here video opera-
tions refer to content-preserving operations/
attacks (distortions) that are made to the video 
intentionally or unintentionally. The commonly 
used operations include format changes, signal 
processing operations, changes in brightness/
contrast, added noise, rotation, cropping, logo 
insertion, compression, etc. To justify our dis-
cussions, we compare our algorithm with the 
correlation coefficient-based algorithm (Wang 
et al., 2007b), the HD-based algorithm (Lin et 
al., 2011) and the TIRI-DCT based algorithm 
(Esmaeili et al., 2011). It is worth mentioning 
that the TIRI-DCT based algorithm (Esmaeili 
et al., 2011) was originally proposed for video 
copy detection rather than frame duplication 
detection. Generally, video copy means the copy 
Table	3.	Results	about	video	clips	without	video	operations	
Video Algorithm TPR(%) FPR (%) Time (ms)
coastguard_1
Ours 100 0 16014
TIRI-DCT 100 0 19734
Correlation Coef-
ficient
100
0 238056
HD 100 0 11555
news_1
Ours 100 0 16391
TIRI-DCT 100 6 20233
Correlation Coef-
ficient
100
0 176483
HD 100 0 14570
foreman_1
Ours 100 0 16462
TIRI-DCT 100 0 20077
Correlation Coef-
ficient
100
0 178464
HD 100 0 10498
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of all the frames that constitute the video. So 
we directly apply this algorithm to frame dupli-
cation detection. The experimental results are 
given in Table 3. The TPR values for all of the 
four algorithms are 100%. On the other hand, 
the FPR values for all the algorithms except 
the TIRI-DCT based algorithm (Esmaeili et al., 
2011) are 0. For the TIRI-DCT based algorithm 
(Esmaeili et al., 2011), however, it has a 6% 
FPR when dealing with news_1. This result 
implies that the algorithm is very sensitive to 
the duplicated content, and even this duplicated 
content (i.e., the drama shown on the small 
screen in the background) is truly part of the 
original content and has not undergone any 
video processing, this algorithm still regards 
the video clip as forgery video. Apparently, 
such an over sensitivity is not a good property 
because it would greatly increase false alarm 
rates in real-world applications. In terms of 
computational efficiency, our algorithm requires 
much less time than the algorithm in Wang et 
al. (2007b). It also has a small advantage over 
the algorithm in Esmaeili et al. (2011). But the 
HD-based algorithm requires even less time than 
our algorithm due to its small computational 
complexity. Overall, the HD-based algorithm 
(Lin et al., 2011) has the best performance on 
videos without undergoing video operations.
Test on Video Clips with 
Brightness Change
A fingerprint should be robust to the content-
preserving distortions present in a video (Es-
maeili et al., 2011). Due to various reasons (e.g., 
to improve video quality, save storage space or 
communicate on a narrow band-width network), 
video operations are widely used in real-world 
applications, which may greatly affect the per-
formance of forgery detection algorithms. This 
work focuses on investigating the robustness 
of the detection algorithm against typical video 
processing such as brightness change and video 
compression. In this subsection, we first address 
the performance of the proposed algorithm on 
videos subject to brightness change. We increase 
by 1 the average luminance of the duplicated 
frames to generate the tampered video coast-
guard_2, news_2 and foreman_2 and reduce by 
1 the average luminance of the duplicated frames 
to produce the tampered video coastguard_3, 
news_3 and foreman_3. The detection results 
are given in Table 4.
It can be observed that the FPR values for 
the four algorithms remain the same as those 
obtained on the videos without undertaking 
video operations. With respect to TPR, three 
algorithms have obvious changes. However, 
the performance of the correlation-based algo-
rithm (Wang et al., 2007b) is least affected. The 
main reason is that the mean subtraction op-
eration in the normalized correlation calculation 
can suppress the effect of the average change 
to pixel values to some degree. We can observe 
that the algorithm in Wang et al. (2007b) out-
performs either our algorithm or the algorithm 
in Esmaeili et al. (2011) for coastguard_2 al-
though it has the same good performance as 
our algorithm in other cases. On the other hand, 
the impact of brightness change on our algorithm 
and the algorithm in (Esmaeili et al., 2011) can 
be reflected by the decrease of TPR values in 
the cases of coastguard_2,	foreman_2 and fore-
man_3. However, our algorithm is a little bet-
ter than the algorithm in Esmaeili et al. (2011) 
when we take into account the FPR values. The 
latter algorithm still suffers from a 6% FPR 
when handling news_2. We owe the similar 
performance between our algorithm and the 
algorithm in Esmaeili et al. (2011) to the fact 
that both of them adopt the same AC coefficients 
of DCT for generating the fingerprint. The 
average luminance increase or decrease often 
does not have much impact on the AC coeffi-
cients. In contrast, the HD-based algorithm in 
Lin et al. (2011) has the worst performance 
among the four algorithms. For all the test 
videos, the TPR values for this algorithm are 
0, meaning that it can barely resist the effect of 
brightness change. The underlying reason is 
that such a video operation usually results in a 
significant change to the histogram difference.
Let us compare computation time (i.e., 
computational complexity) of these four al-
gorithms. The correlation-based algorithm in 
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Wang et al. (2007b) runs quite slow due to 
large amount of correlation computations. Our 
algorithm greatly outperforms that algorithm 
because it does not rely on correlation computa-
tions. Our algorithm is also better than the algo-
rithm in Esmaeili et al. (2011) to some degree. 
The reason is that the medians of coefficients 
in our algorithm are respectively calculated 
in vertical direction and in horizontal direc-
tion, and thus the complexity is lower because 
the sequence length is halved in this situation 
compared with that in Esmaeili et al. (2011). 
Consider the HD-based algorithm fails in this 
situation, we do not compare its computation 
Table	4.	Results	about	video	clips	with	brightness	change	
Videos Algorithm TPR (%) FPR (%) Time (ms)
coastguard_2
Ours 99.23 0 15958
TIRI-DCT 99.23 0 19453
Correlation 
Coefficient
100 0 236044
HD 0 0 1201
coastguard_3
Ours 100 0 15896
TIRI-DCT 100 0 19593
Correlation 
Coefficient
100 0 233813
HD 0 0 1201
news_2
Ours 100 0 16494
TIRI-DCT 100 6 20233
Correlation 
Coefficient
100 0 176342
HD 0 0 5366
news_3
Ours 100 0 16479
TIRI-DCT 100 6 20225
Correlation 
Coefficient
100 0 176358
HD 0 0 6427
foreman_2
Ours 83.33 0 16621
TIRI-DCT 83.33 0 20124
Correlation 
Coefficient
83.33 0 181662
HD 0 0 1419
foreman_3
Ours 83.33 0 16495
TIRI-DCT 83.33 0 20061
Correlation 
Coefficient
83.33 0 178792
HD 0 0 1232
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time with that of other algorithms. Based on 
the detection performance and computational 
complexity, our algorithm is superior to the 
other three algorithms.
Test on MPEG Compressed Videos
Videos in MPEG format are very common 
in daily life. So the performance of detection 
algorithms on compressed videos becomes 
an important issue in practical applications. 
To evaluate the performance of the proposed 
detection algorithm, we generate six MPEG 
compressed videos. For generality, this work 
adopts the GOP (group of pictures) structure of 
(15, 3), which is one of the most commonly used 
settings. By employing the encoding bit rates 
of 4 Mbps and 3.2 Mbps, we obtain the videos 
Table	5.	Results	about	MPEG	compressed	videos	
Video Algorithm TPR (%) FPR (%) Time (ms)
coastguard_4M
Ours 51.54 0 17185
TIRI-DCT 50.77 0 20685
Correlation 
Coefficient
0 0 238758
HD 0 0 7753
coastguard_3.2M
Ours 32.31 0 17242
TIRI-DCT 48.46 0 20592
Correlation 
Coefficient
0 0 234187
HD 0 0 7675
news_4M
Ours 37 2 17467
TIRI-DCT 0 0 21356
Correlation 
Coefficient
0 0 180242
HD 0 0 7566
news_3.2M
Ours 50 0 17430
TIRI-DCT 0 0 21340
Correlation 
Coefficient
0 0 176358
HD 0 0 8143
foreman_4M
Ours 71.67 0 17514
TIRI-DCT 44.17 0 21075
Correlation 
Coefficient
0 0 178885
HD 0 0 6786
foreman_3.2M
Ours 53.33 0 17195
TIRI-DCT 56.67 0 21013
Correlation 
Coefficient
0 0 178841
HD 0 0 6536
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coastguard_4M, coastguard_3.2M, news_4M, 
news_3.2M, foreman_4M and foreman_3.2M. 
The detection results of the four algorithms are 
given in Table 5.
With respect to FPR, all the four algorithms 
have good performance in this aspect except a 
2% FPR for our algorithm in the case of 
news_4M. On the other hand, the TPR for all 
of the four algorithms declines seriously. It can 
be seen that the correlation coefficient-based 
algorithm in Wang et al. (2007b) and the HD-
based algorithm in Lin et al. (2011) can hardly 
detect any duplication. In contrast, our algorithm 
and the algorithm in Esmaeili et al. (2011) show 
a certain degree of robustness. For the encoding 
bit rates of 4 Mbps, the TPR values for our 
algorithm are apparently higher than those for 
the algorithm in Esmaeili et al. (2011). How-
ever, with the increase of compression, the 
latter may outperform our algorithm. The TPR 
values for the algorithm in Esmaeili et al. (2011) 
are higher than those for our algorithm in the 
case of coastguard_3.2M and foreman_3.2M 
when the encoding bit rates decline to 3.2 Mbps. 
It is a little surprising that the TPR values for 
the algorithm in Esmaeili et al. (2011) are 0. 
Perhaps it is because news contains less dy-
namic contents and the MPEG compression 
reduces the features of those contents. From 
this result, the flexibility of our algorithm to 
deal with videos with different contents is also 
exhibited.
As for computation time, our algorithms 
run faster than the algorithm in Esmaeili et al. 
(2011). Since both the algorithm in Wang et al. 
(2007b) and the algorithm in Lin et al. (2011) 
fail in this situation, we do not discuss their 
computation time. Obviously, our algorithm 
still has the best overall performance among 
the four algorithms.
CONCLUSION
Frame duplication is a low-cost video opera-
tion to change the meaning of a video. Such 
a manipulation can be used innocently and 
maliciously. When a video is used as evidence 
in court of law, we have to verify whether this 
video has undergone any video forgery manipu-
lation including frame duplication. Therefore, 
the study on this topic is important from the 
perspective of forensic investigation. Although 
some attention has been paid to this research 
area, the gap between the algorithms available 
in literature and the real-world applications is 
still large. More efforts need to be made for the 
design of more efficient and robust algorithms.
In this paper, we have proposed a frame 
duplication detection algorithm. Our fingerprint 
is based on the improved features derived 
from TIRI-DCT. Our major contributions are 
the construction of new fingerprints of sub-
sequences and the use of a simple metric for 
video matching. Compared with current related 
algorithms, the proposed detection algorithm 
achieves a better tradeoff between computation 
time and detection capability. It shows stronger 
robustness against typical video operations like 
MPEG compression and brightness change. On 
the other hand, our experiments also exhibit 
some drawbacks of the proposed algorithm, for 
example, the 2% FPR in the case of news_4M. 
We think that these drawbacks mainly result 
from the structure of fingerprints, the metric 
employed for video matching, and the selection 
of decision threshold. In our future work, we 
will focus on investigating these issues.
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